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ESSAY 
WHAT IS A POSTMODERN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM? 
J.M. Balkin* 
I 
I begin with a puzzle. It must certainly strike one as odd that the 
subject of postmodern constitutional law arises at a time when the ac-
tual arbiters of the Constitution - the federal judiciary and in particu-
lar the Supreme Court of the United States - appear to be more 
conservative than they have been for many years, and indeed, are 
likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Postmodernism is often 
associated with what is new, innovative, and on the cutting edge of 
cultural development. Yet if we were to define the elements of a 
postmodern constitutional culture, it would be clear that one of the 
most central features of the present period - if the expression "cen-
tral" still has any remaining currency in an era of postmodernism - is 
a judiciary which has no intention of being new or innovative in any-
thing. Its intellectual leader, Justice Scalia, has even called for a con-
stitutional jurisprudence of tradition, coupled with a return to an 
interpretive theory of plain meanings for statutes and original inten-
tion with respect to the Constitution.1 
To be sure, some might be tempted to explain away this phenome-
non as an anomaly or an exception. The federal judiciary, they will 
say, is behind the times, much as the Lochner-era justices were. Even-
tually, when a different administration comes to power, and appoints 
new judges, the judiciary will catch up with the breathtaking develop-
ments we now discuss under the name of "postmodern" jurisprudence. 
Indeed, all about us we see, in the works of legal commentators and 
scholars, and even in the speeches of a few enlightened political lead-
ers, the harbingers of a new dawn of constitutional postmodernism. 
* Charles Tilford McCormick Professor of Law, University of Texas. - Ed. This essay was 
presented at a conference on postmodern constitutional law at Georgetown University, and I 
thank the participants for their comments; my special thanks to Pierre Schlag and Steven Winter 
for their valuable criticisms of an earlier draft. 
1. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. 
Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527, 528-29 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 
87, 97-100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Antonin Scalia, Originalism, The Lesser Evil, 57 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
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The current climate of the federal judiciary is an aberration, a mistake 
which hinders the progress of a grand new postmodern day. 
Nevertheless, I think the attempt to see a postmodern constitu-
tional jurisprudence in opposition to the increasingly conservative 
practice of constitutional law is mistaken. It is understandable why 
postmodern theorists might wish to identify postmodernism with the 
progressive, with the new that will eventually replace the old, and 
deny that title to the work of the Rehnquist Court and the rest of the 
Reagan judiciary. Yet to treat constitutional law as it is actually prac-
ticed by courts as foreign or exceptional to a postmodern era or as the 
target of an eventual postmodern revolution fails fully to grasp the 
meaning of postmodernism as a feature of current culture. Moreover, 
I think that such an attempted marginalization would be ironic com-
ing from those who claim to adopt a postmodern (and especially post-
structuralist) stance. Rather than seeing this political phenomenon as 
exceptional or aberrational to postmodern constitutional culture, I 
think we should see it as exemplary of that culture. Postmodern con-
stitutionalism is the constitutionalism of reactionary judges sur-
rounded by a libera). academy that despises or disregards them, and 
which is despised and disregarded in tum; postmodern constitutional 
culture is the culture in which the control of constitutional lawmaking 
apparatus is in the hands of the most conservative forces in main-
stream life, while constitutional law as practiced in the legal academy 
has cast itself adrift, whether out of desperation, disgust, or despair, 
and engaged itself in spinning gossamer webs of republicanism, decon-
struction, dialogism, feminism, or what have you. Postmodern legal 
culture is the rout of progressive forces, the increasing insularity, self-
absorption, and fragmentation of progressive academic writing, and 
the increasing irrelevence of that writing to the positive law of the U.S. 
Constitution. 
How is this possible? What does postmodernism mean if Chief 
Justice Rehnquist already presides over the postmodern Supreme 
Court? What is the promise of postmodernism or of postmodern con-
stitutionalism in such an age? We can resolve this puzzle if we dispel 
certain notions about what postmodernism is and what is or should be 
our relationship to it. 
II 
· We must distinguish several different facets of postmodernism. 
First, postmodernism is the cultural era in which we live - the era of 
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postmodernity.2 It is in some ways a furtherance of and in other ways 
an outgrowth of and reaction to an earlier epoch called modernity. 
Like modernity, it combines changes in politics, art, and philosophy 
with changes in technology and methods of economic production.3 In 
particular, while modernity is often associated with the Industrial 
Revolution and mass production of material goods, postmodernism is 
better identified with the rise of mass forms of communication and the 
commodification of intellectual products and symbolic forms. 4 It is 
the era of mass culture and mediazation, a term used to describe the 
ways in which culture and cultural artifacts are adapted to or created 
for the forms of mass communication. 5 Postmodernism in this sense is 
neither necessarily a good thing nor a bad thing. It is a cultural mo-
ment that needs to be interpreted and understood. In this sense, 
postmodernism, like modernism, embraces all who live within a cul-
ture, comprehending the fact that people will react to changes in soci-
ety in many different ways. 
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that the postmodern ep-
och as such is already upon us. Postmodernism is a cultural phenome-
non that has already happened and that we are <?nlY becoming aware 
of now. Cultural change occurs as we live within a culture, but we 
only become aware of its full import later. Cultural understanding 
always works in retrospect. 6 For us to speak of postmodernism as a 
coherent cultural episode in our lives, it must have already occurred; it 
must already be a part of our existence, albeit something that we are 
only now coming to codify, analyze, and understand. By the time that 
2. See DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDmON OF POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE 
ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE (1989); FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CUL-
TURAL Lome OF LATE CAPITALISM (1991); JEAN-FRAN~OIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN 
CONDmON: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984). 
3. See HARVEY, supra note 2. 
4. Different versions of the "information society" thesis can be found in DANIEL BELL, THE 
CoMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1973); JAMES R. BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLU· 
TION: TECHNOLOGICAL AND EcONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1986); and 
WILSON P. DIZARD, JR., THE CoMING INFORMATION AGE: AN OVERVIEW OF TECHNOLOGY, 
EcoNOMICS, AND PoLmcs (2d ed. 1985). On the concept of "symbolic forms," see JOHN B. 
THOMPSON, IDEOLOGY AND MODERN CULTURE 136-45 (1990). 
5. THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 3-4, 11-20. The "photo opportunity," the televised criminal 
trial, and radio call-in show are all examples of mediazation. The rise of mass forms of electronic 
communication, including broadcast and cable television, satellite communication and computer 
networks, is central to understanding the transformation of culture brought about by postmoder-
nity. For a pessimistic view of the consequences ofmediazation on politics and culture generally, 
see JEAN BAUDRILLARD, FOR A CRmQUE OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SIGN 164-84 
(Charles Levin trans., 1981). 
6. See ARTHUR c. DANTO, ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 168 (1965); HANS·GE-
ORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 179 (1975). The most famous expression of this princi-
ple is Hegel'~ metaphor of the Owl of Minerva, which spreads its wings only after night has 
fallen. HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 13 (T. M. Knox trans., 1967). 
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we understand postmodernism, postmodernism itself will already have 
been transformed into something quite different. We will then be en-
meshed in a new cultural ethos of which we will be only dimly aware, 
not fully conscious of the elements of social life by which we are de-
fined and by which later generations will define us. The best that we 
can hope to do is to define the present age by extrapolation from what 
is immediately past, which we can begin to understand and synthesize. 
Second, postmodernism is also the set of cultural products created 
during the era of postmodernity. These cultural products reflect this 
era in different ways. Some are mimetic. If the postmodern era is an 
era of fragmentation, diffusion, emphasis on surface (as opposed to 
substance or as substance itself), then we might expect to see fragmen-
tation, diffusion, and emphasis on surface in cultural artifacts of the 
postmodern period. And we do find this, for example, in the develop-
ment of the music video. 7 Some elements of postmodern culture, far 
from being mimetic of postmodernism, will be reactions to it, just as 
Romanticism was a reaction to the perceived deadening of modem life 
brought on by the Industrial Revolution. Often, however, the reaction 
will include cultural forms that are mimetic of postmodern cultural 
themes in an unintended and uncanny way. Thus, in the postmodern 
period we see a renewed interest in "natural" foods and health, and 
"natural" experiences, which, when viewed more closely, tum out to 
be high-tech, mediaized, or commodified. The back-to-nature enthusi-
ast who purchases an expensive backpack constructed of artificial fi-
bers, who eats food advertised as containing "all natural ingredients" 
that is mass produced and preserved in sealed plastic wrappers, and 
who exercises using the latest electronically monitored cycling 
machine, reinscribes elements of postmodernism even as she reacts to 
them. "Health" and "naturalness" become not only focal points of 
reaction to postmodern life, but also symbols subject to commodifica-
tion and consumerist manipulation. Nor is this unintentional rein-
scription of postmodernist culture unique to the food and health 
industries. The devotee of "authentic performances" in music is able 
to enjoy them because of recording technology wholly alien to the cir-
cumstances in which early music was first performed, a technology 
that allows her (for example) to experience "authentic" performances 
7. STEVEN CONNOR, POSTMODERN CULTURE 160-61 (1989) (noting that juxtaposition of 
images within videos as well as juxtaposition of rock images from different decades "flatten[s] 
rock history into an undifferentiated present"). On MTV's connections to postmodernism gener-
ally, see E. ANN KAPLAN, ROCKING AROUND THE CLOCK: MUSIC TELEVISION, POSTMODERN-
JSM, AND CONSUMER CULTURE 49-88 (1987). 
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of church music repeatedly on her car stereo. 8 The politician who as-
pires to avoid the artificiality of Washington politics and to mount an 
appeal to "the people" campaigns through a combination of sound 
bites and photo opportunities. Her private life is carefully recon-
structed for public display. 
Postmodernism understood as the products of a cultural era is not 
something uniformly to be prized. Postmodernism as a cultural phe-
nomenon is not necessarily progressive or morally valuable. There is 
no guarantee that postmodernism will prove to be "politically correct" 
(this phrase itself, and its use to attack progressivism, are products of 
the postmodern era). If we recall, modernism itself was not progres-
sive in all of its implications. Modernism brought us industrial meth-
ods of mass production and undreamed of technological progress. 
Modernism also brought us the Holocaust.9 Like modernism before it, 
postmodernism is morally ambiguous. MTV is a paradigmatically 
postmodern phenomenon in its style of pastiche, fragmentation, and 
mediazation. It is also often violent, mindless, and misogynistic, and 
many critics fear that it conveys and reinforces these attitudes in the 
minds of its viewers. The 1988 presidential campaign was the essence 
of postmodern politics. It featured intensive mediazation of messages 
and symbols, lack of mass participation except as consumers of these 
symbols, emphasis on the surface features of political discourse and, 
indeed, the swallowing of substance by surface, so that surface became 
the substance of political discourse. The self-referential quality of 
postmodernist experience was well demonstrated by ubiquitous polit-
ical polls that came to reflect not only what people thought about 
events, but what people expected that they and other people would 
think about events. 
The management and manipulation of "photo opportunities" and 
"media events" had previously been honed throughout the eight years 
of the Reagan presidency.Io This presidency, in tum, was led (if that 
is the proper word) by an actor who played the role of a president, or 
8. See Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Pelforming Arts, 139 U. PA. 
L. R.Ev. 1597, 1622 (1991). 
9. The degeneration of modernity into dehumanizing wickedness is the famous argument of 
MAx HORKHEIMER & THEODOR w. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT (John Cum-
ming trans., Herder and Herder 1972) (1944). 
10. On the Reagan administration's development of highly effective methods of media ma-
nipulation, see MARK HERTSGAARD, ON BENDED KNEE: THE PRESS AND THE REAGAN PRES-
IDENCY (1988); DOUGLAS KELLNER, TELEVISION AND THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY 134-42 
(1990); DONALD T. REGAN, FOR THE RECORD (1988). On the Reagan administration's use of 
staged media events and political spectacle, see TIMOTHY W. LUKE, SCREENS OF POWER (1989); 
Jochen Schulte-Sasse, Electronic Media and Cultural Politics in the Reagan Era, CULTURAL CRI· 
TIQUE, Winter 1987-88, at 123. 
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rather the role of an actor playing the role of a president, with such 
bravado that it became difficult to tell the difference between role play-
ing and the real thing. This was a president who so confounded dis-
tinctions between surface and substance, between smoke and mirrors 
and actual events, between real economic development and the crea-
tion of fictitious capital financed by a mountain of debt, that it was at 
last quite impossible to discern what had actually happened during the 
eight years of his presidency. Thus, for those who desire a postmodern 
politics, a word of warning: We have already lived through the 
postmodern presidency; we have already seen the rise of the 
postmodern presidential campaign. All of this must give anyone who 
celebrates postmodernism pause. To label something postmodern in 
this sense, then, is not to hold it up as a model to anyone who wants to 
be intellectually fashionable, but rather to present it as a cultural event 
that needs to be studied to understand how culture has changed for 
better or worse. This done, we must then ask how, given the changes 
in political culture wrought in the postmodern era, we can make poli-
tics better. 
This cultural or sociological understanding of the concept of 
postmodernism is comparatively straightforward, even if the bounda-
ries of the concept are debatable. However, there is a third meaning to 
postmodernism. Postmodernism is also a set of critical or theoretical 
claims about how art should be created, or how philosophy should be 
written (or not written at all!) - a set of general perspectives for inter-
preting and evaluating culture and the products of culture.11 The 
postmodern architect embraces decorative play and decentering; the 
postmodernist art critic attempts to find postmodern themes in the 
works of postmodern artists.12 In this sense, postmodernism is an in-
terpretive practice that is claimed to be artistically or theoretically val-
uable or beneficial. Postmodernism is something to be celebrated or 
encouraged rather than simply an epoch to be understood. It is also 
associated with being on the cutting edge of cultural production or the 
interpretation or criticism of cultural production. In philosophy, 
postmodernism is an attack on what are called "totalizing" theories or 
"master narratives" that seek to explain all or substantially all of soci-
11. E.g., LYOTARD, supra note 2; RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDAR-
ITY (1989); UNIVERSAL ABANDON? THE PoLmCS OF PosrMODERNISM (Andrew Ross ed., 
1989). For jurisprudential applications, see CoSTAS DOUZINAS ET AL., POSTMODERN JURIS-
PRUDENCE: THE LAW OF TExT IN THE TExTs OF LAW (1991). 
12. On the postmodern theory of architecture, see CHARLES JENCKS, THE LANGUAGE OF 
POST-MODERN ARCHITECTURE (1977). A recurring feature of postmodern art is the "attempt 
to dissolve the boundaries between 'high' and 'mass' culture." Roy Boyne & Ali Rattansi, The 
Theory and Politics of Postmodernism, in PosrMODERNISM AND SOCIETY 1, 9-10 (Roy Boyne & 
Ali Rattansi eds., 1990). 
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ety, history, knowledge, the nature of femininity, or virtually anything 
else within a comprehensive and articulable theory. 13 From the per-
spective of postmodern philosophy, there is only a set of overlapping 
and occasionally conflicting "language games" that arise with respect 
to different spheres of social life, each incomplete and each constantly 
subject to alteration and development. 14 The analogy to "games" is 
important because it is also characteristic of postmodern philosophy to 
view knowledge as an activity infused with social interaction and 
power rather than merely a set of articulable propositions or truths. 15 
Postmodern philosophy contrasts with relativism because conflicting 
perspectives are embedded in people's lives and activities; it contrasts 
with objectivism because it eschews the type of totalizing discourse 
that objectivism involves, as well as the reduction of knowledge to pro-
positions and claims rather than action and power. 
III 
Thus, postmodernism is both a situation in which we find ourselves 
and a cultural response to that situation. Because the cultural re-
sponse becomes part of the cultural situation, the two elements feed 
upon each other. Similarly, postmodernism is both a cultural situation 
and a set of claims about how that culture should be interpreted, al-
tered and continued. Because such acts of interpretation, alteration 
and continuation stem from the culture, they share features in com-
mon with that culture. 
Nevertheless, the overlapping meanings of postmodernism are lia-
ble to produce a number of confusions. The first is what we might call 
the "bandwagon" phenomenon. This is the attempt to celebrate or 
applaud certain features of cultural life simply because they are 
postmodern, or to believe that desirable forms of culture are produced 
by consciously attempting to incorporate postmodern themes. In 
short, it is the fallacy that conscious mimesis of postmodernism in the 
first two senses of that term - the cultural milieu and its products -
necessarily achieves postmodernism in the third sense - a set of cul-
tural methods or goals that should be commended and pursued. Obvi-
13. See LYOTARD, supra note 2; Nancy Fraser & Linda J. Nicholson, Social Criticism without 
Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism and Postmodemism, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERN· 
ISM 19 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990). 
14. See LYOTARD, supra note 2, at 10. 
15. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LoGIC OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice trans., 1990); PIERRE 
BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice trans., 1977); MICHEL FOU-
CAULT, THE HISfORY OF SEXUALITY - VOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley 
trans., 1978); MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS & OTHER 
WRmNGS 1972-77 (Colin Gordon ed., 1980). 
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ously, this can have highly undesirable effects. For example, one 
might be tempted to create a jurisprudence that is fragmented, cele-
brates surfaces, irony, and pastiche, and eschews master narratives 
because those are postmodernist themes and so that is what a 
postmodern jurisprudence should look like. This confuses 
postmodernism as a set of cultural phenomena that appear in a partic-
ular epoch with a set of criteria for judgment. The jurisprudence pro-
duced during the postmodern era will turn out to display elements of 
postmodernity whether this is consciously desired or not. That does 
not mean, however, that these are necessarily useful or desirable fea-
tures of contemporary jurisprudence. 
The second problem is the converse of the first. After hearing end-
less talk of postmodernist manifestos, it is easy to reduce postmodern-
ism to a set of normative claims and thus forget that postmodemism 
also involves larger cultural forces that occur without any person par-
ticularly desiring their ascendancy. In his review of Fredric Jameson's 
book on postmodernism, Robert Post asserts that it is "obvious[] that 
postmodernism affects only certain segments of contemporary life."16 
He offers as proof that there is "no postmodern physics, although 
there are postmodern accounts of physics. There is no postmodern 
medicine, although there are postmodern histories of medicine. There 
is no postmodern law, although there are postmodern commentaries 
on law."17 A modernist and proud of it, Post finds it impossible to 
translate the manifestos of postmodernists into actual practices that 
would make any sense in science, law, or medicine. How, or more 
significantly why, would anyone set out to eschew master narratives in 
physics, for example, or produce fragmentation in the practice of law 
or medicine? Thus, Post argues that although postmodemists can 
comment on these practices as outsiders, postmodemism can have no 
effect on the way they are actually performed.18 
Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between postmodern-
ism as a set of normative standards and postmodemism as a cultural 
phenomenon. Even if one believes, as Post does, that postmodern nor-
mative claims are unsuited or inapplicable to certain social practices, it 
does not follow that the cultural forces we collectively label 
16. Robert Post, Postmodern Temptations, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. (forthcoming 1992) (re-
viewing JAMESON, supra note 2). 
17. Id. 
18. For a contrary view see Stephen Toulmin, The Construal of Reality: Criticism in Modem 
and Postmodern Science, in THE PoLmCS OF INTERPRETATION 99 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1983) 
(The standard opposition of norms of scientific theory construction to postmodern critical con-
cepts is based on an idealized and outmoded view of scientific practice that does not adequately 
take into account what scientists actually do.). 
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"postmodemity" have not affected these practices. To study these ef-
fects is not simply to give a "postmodern" account of them any more 
than to study the effects of modernity on social practices is to give a 
"modem" account of them. It is to ask rather how the forces that 
define any cultural age (whether modernity or postmodernity) affect 
the practices that take place within that age. In short, I argue that one 
does not have to be a postmodernist to recognize the pervasive effects 
of postmodernity in our lives. 
The postmodern era is an era of industrial practices and mass or-
ganization and production applied not to material objects like 
automobiles but to the products of the mind - art and music, knowl-
edge and information, accounting and other service industries. In this 
sense, it is quite clear that we are already witnessing postmodern legal 
and medical practice. The industrial model of production - where 
production is reinterpreted according to discrete units of production 
measurable in temporal or spatial categories - has already arrived in 
law. We already have the seventy-hour billed week, the canned brief, 
the 500-person law firm churning out mountains of paper to prove its 
value to its corporate clientele. We already have mass-produced litiga-
tion and mass-produced judicial administration to deal with it. Al-
ready most federal judicial opinions are written by twenty-five-year 
olds, so that the language of opinions does not really mean what it 
says, because it was not said by the persons whose meaning really 
counts. In medicine, we already have the industrial model of treat-
ment - the structuring of medical practice around procedures that 
can be tabulated and described in reports to insurance companies, the 
physician who is rewarded not for her bedside manner but her ability 
to perform so many operations in an hour, and who bills accordingly. 
The age of the independent doctor has been replaced by that of the 
hospital bureaucrat. Older conceptions of professionalism have al-
ready been supplanted by an industrial model where service is defined 
in terms of discrete units of production that can be duplicated and 
evaluated on a mass scale. The lawyers let go by large New York law 
firms after the 1987 stock market crash quickly learned that employ-
ment practices in service sectors, and even in professional service sec-
tors, had mutated into a model of employer-employee relations quite 
like those that Ford or General Motors applied to blue collar work-
ers.19 Only cognitive resistance to recognizing this transformation led 
partners at these firms to engage in the disreputable claim that all of 
these attorneys were let go because they were not good lawyers, thus 
19. See, e.g., Michael Orey, No Longer Risk-Free, AM. LAW., Dec. 1990, at 5 (noting 
changes in law firm thinking about hiring and firing of lawyers). 
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preserving the rhetoric of a preindustrial professionalism to justify 
what were clearly profit-motivated layoffs. 20 Likewise, the day of the 
individual scientist boldly grappling with the truths of the universe has 
given way to a complicated and bureaucratic model of research, where 
teams of scientists compete for institutional dollars and where schol-
arly factories are expected to produce a steady stream of papers as 
justification for their continued existence. 
Perhaps the most confusing aspect of postmodernism is the 
postmodernist insistence on the relation between thought and action. 
This is a claim of postmodernist philosophy, a feature of post-
modernist critical interpretation, and a fact about postmodern culture 
revealed by postmodern interpretations. The postmodern philosopher 
asserts that knowledge is always inscribed in a form of life; the histori-
cal experience of postmodernity is the unfolding of cultural phenom-
ena that demonstrate the philosopher's claim. Thus, postmodernism 
is not merely an epistemological stance, nor is it merely a series of 
claims or statements about knowledge. To be sure, postmodernism is 
often identified with claims that knowledge is a web of beliefs rather 
than a Cartesian framework of foundational knowledge, with the idea 
that instead of a single totalizing discourse, we have a multiplicity of 
competing and contradictory language games in which we express our-
selves and our views about the world.21 Lyotard even goes so far as to 
define postmodernism as a hostility to the idea of a master narrative. 22 
However, it is this very epistemological interpretation that leads one to 
think that postmodernism is merely another form of relativism dressed 
up in fancier clothing and thus leads one to debate postmodernism as a 
philosophical position like objectivism or relativism. 
Yet a purely epistemological reading captures neither the meaning 
of postmodernist philosophy nor the experience of postmodern cul-
ture. Postmodernism is not simply a set of beliefs that persons happen 
to hold, although those beliefs are surely part of the cultural phenome-
non we call postmodernity. Rather, they are those beliefs inscribed in 
ways of living that characterize the late twentieth century, and espe-
cially the life of postindustrial western societies. These features in-
clude the growth of mass media and telecommunications and the 
cultural effects that both mass media and telecommunications have 
20. See, e.g., Sheryl Gross-Glaser, Firing Trends: Laid-off New York Associates Keep Head-
hunters Busy, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1990, at 23 (estimating that 750 to 1500 New York associates were 
fired in cutbacks and that associates are hampered in finding new jobs by their former firms' 
denial that layoffs were economically motivated). 
21. See LYOTARD, supra note 2, at 10; Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 
CORNELL L. REV. 254, 256-57 n.9 (1992). 
22. LYOTARD, supra note 2, at xxiv. 
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had in society, as well as the rise of computer technologies and the 
creation of urban and suburban centers quite different from living ar-
rangements found at the turn of the century.23 Postmodernism con-
cerns the ways in which the material conditions of life have changed, 
not simply in the Marxist sense of ownership of the means of produc-
tion, but in the more ordinary sense of how we go about living our 
daily lives - lives that are imbued with television, telephones, cable 
TV, international satellite hookups, film, video cassettes, and so on. 
Surely the epistemological programs of postmodernist philosophers 
are part of this cultural milieu. But they are only a small part. CNN 
and the modern enclosed shopping mall have had a much more signifi-
cant defining influence on the postmodernist age than any of Richard 
Rorty's writings. 
Thus, emphasis on cultural practices and ways of living is a key 
element of postmodern thought. If to imagine a language is to imagine 
a form of life, then language, thought, and the material conditions of 
life are inextricably intertwined. Knowledge is a set of language 
games, as opposed to a set of true beliefs; games imply activity, lived 
experience and interaction. Knowledge, then, is not something that 
we know but something that we do, or that is done to us. The Carte-
sian cogito becomes transformed: Instead of "I think therefore I am," 
we have "I think as I am." 
For the modernist mind, this merging of thought and activity 
seems unnecessary and perhaps even bizarre. If there is such a thing 
as postmodernist philosophy, then there must be a set of 
postmodernist beliefs, and these must be true or false. From the 
standpoint of modernism, postmodernism is just another ideology -
another claim to totalizing discourse.24 But from its own perspective 
postmodernism cannot be such a discourse because it is not merely a 
set of beliefs, but also a cultural environment in which beliefs occur. 
IV 
What, then, is a postmodern constitutionalism? It should be quite 
clear from what I have said above that I do not think that the greatest 
relevance of postmodernism to American constitutional law lies in 
methods of interpreting the Constitution. Rather, I think constitu-
tional lawyers need to understand postmodernism because they need 
to understand the cultural changes that have taken place around them 
23. See HARVEY, supra note 2; MARK POSTER, THE MODE OF INFORMATION: POSTSTRUC• 
TURALISM AND SOCIAL CONTEXT (1990). 
24. See Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law. 67 TEXAS L. REV. 1195, 
1245-46 (1989) (describing how postmodemism is reinterpreted in rationalist accounts). 
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in art, politics, technology, and economics. Just as one cannot under-
stand modernism without understanding the Industrial Revolution 
and the spurt of technological and cultural change that accompanied 
it, one cannot understand postmodernism without understanding the 
particular technological and cultural changes in society that have ac-
companied it. Postmodernity is the era in which the industrial model 
of mass production is applied to the creation and distribution of sym-
bolic forms. Therefore, we might approach the question of 
postmodern constitutionalism in the following way: How have 
changes in technology, communication, and the organization of living 
and working changed the public's understandings and practice of law, 
the Constitution, human rights, and democracy? How should the var-
ious social actors concerned with the Constitution (lawyers, judges, 
academics, legislators, citizens) understand the forms and practices of 
democratic self-government in light of the cultural changes occurring 
during the postmodern period, and what should they do in response to 
these changes? 
In stating the question this way, I wish specifically to contrast my 
perspective with the view or assumption that constitutional 
postmodernism primarily involves questions of how to interpret the 
Constitution using postmodernist theories of interpretation or insights 
gained from understanding the "postmodern" or the socially con-
structed self. These projects may be useful ones. Yet they are only 
part of the story. To focus on postmodern theories of subjectivity 
without understanding the cultural and technological basis of change 
risks turning postmodernism into a sterile form of idealism. 
Moreover, my analysis seeks to go beyond the concern with the 
"social construction of the subject" commonly associated with 
postmodernism in law.25 Without further development, there is the 
danger that such analyses will remain rooted in an overly idealist con-
ception of culture. Shared symbols, values, discourses, or ideas are 
25. The construction of the individual by culture is a key theme in the emerging category of 
postmodern jurisprudence. For recent examples of this scholarship, see STANLEY FISH, DOING 
WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITER-
ARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989); Guyora Binder, Beyond Criticism, 55 u. CHI. L. R.Ev. 888 
(1988); James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible? The Postmodern Subject in Legal Theory, 62 U. 
Cow. L. R.Ev. 489 (1991); Rosemary J. Coombe, Room for Manoeuver: Toward a Theory of 
Practice in Critical Legal Studies, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 69 (1989); Drucilla L. Cornell, Insti-
tutionalization of Meaning. Recollective Imagination and the Potential for Transformative Legal 
Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135 (1988); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in 
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Martha Minow, Identities, 3 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 97 (1991); Patterson, supra note 21; Jeremy Paul, The Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 
TEXAS L. R.Ev. 1779 (1991); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 13 CAL. L. REV. 
1151 (1985); Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1627 (1991); Steven L. 
Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441 
(1990); J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1991) (book review). 
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implicitly assumed to be the "forces" of social construction. But no 
account is given of how this force operates in practice. In contrast, the 
analysis presented here is distinctly material in its concerns. It asks 
how changes in technology and culture create new opportunities for 
the exercise of power. It seeks to draw closer connections between the 
material conditions of life and thought by studying the technological 
re-creation of forms of life. 
A postmodern constitutionalism, in my view, must ask how 
postmodern culture and technology have affected law as an institution: 
the way that the courts, Congress, and the executive interact with each 
other, and the way that law is understood, promulgated, argued about, 
experienced, and assimilated. How is information about constitutional 
rights distributed and spread? What changes have occurred in the 
ways in which politics is organized, and in the ways in which laws are 
debated publicly or within government institutions? How have ad-
vances in technology changed the possible forms of power, control, 
and surveillance? What effect has mediazation wrought on the prac-
tice of American democracy? These are the key questions for a 
postmodern constitutionalist. 
We can divide this general inquiry into several issues. 
A. Technological Changes Affecting Democratic Institutions 
The Constitution regulates democratic self-government. Yet de-
mocracy as a set of institutional practices has changed greatly since 
the Second World War and especially since the 1960s and 1970s. 
Political action committees have taken advantage of developments in 
computerization and data processing to manipulate the political pro-
cess in ways heretofore undreamed of. The past twenty-five years have 
seen the increasing concentration of media industries into multina-
tional conglomerates.26 What effects will these changes have on our 
understanding of free speech and traditional expectations about the 
press as guardians of democracy? What does the First Amendment 
mean in an age of increasing economic concentration in media indus-
tries, or in an age of organizations specifically devoted to mass distri-
bution of political messages? 
Perhaps even more important from the standpoint of 
postmodernist theory, mediazation has fundamentally changed the 
terms of public debate. 27 The movement from newspapers to televi-
26. See BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (3d ed. 1990); KELLNER, supra note 
10, at 80-90; LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH EsrATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 201-03 
(1991); THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 193-205. 
27. KELLNER, supra note 10, at 111-32; THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 218-71. For general 
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sion broadcasting as the major source of public information has 
changed the nature of information received by the public. It has 
changed the public's expectations of political behavior and the content 
and form of political communication.28 What constitutional analysis 
should apply to regulation of public elections in the era of the sound 
bite, the photo opportunity, and the media event? Technological im-
provements have also made possible sophisticated polling techniques, 
whose power has made them indispensable to modem political dis-
course. What effect have these developments had on the democratic 
nature of public opinion? Has virtually instantaneous polling created 
a feedback loop of public expectations about expectations that will 
lead to volatility in public opinion or put in doubt the meaning or the 
authority of "majority preferences"? Worse yet, has the very concept 
of a true "public opinion" that is not manufactured or simulated lost 
its meaning in the postmodern age?29 
Mediazation has not only affected the form in which information 
about public affairs is conveyed to the public; it has also had a 
profound effect on the presentation of the self in public life. Political 
fortunes can vanish overnight by the slightest slip of the tongue when 
it is broadcast nationwide. 30 Mediazation has also permitted revela-
tions about politicians to be broadcast quickly and widely in simplified 
and highly charged symbolic forms. Similarly, the public's expecta-
tions about what will or will not be revealed about political life, and 
hence what aspects of private life are relevant, have surely been af-
fected by the mediazation of politics. 31 
studies, see LUKE, supra note 10; DAN NIMMO & JAMES E. COMBS, MEDIATED PoLmCAL 
REALmES (2d ed. 1990). 
28. A classic account of how "pseudo-events" are created for media consumption is DANIEL 
J. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE (1962). GUY DEBORD, THE SOCIETY OF THE SPECTACLE (1975), 
describes how mediazation contributes to the development of spectacles geared for popular con-
sumption. On the transformation of political election campaigning due to mediazation, see 
KELLNER, supra note 10, at 148-58; JOE McG1NNISS, THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT (Pen-
guin Books 1988) (1969). 
29. Jean Baudrillard's critique of polling and mass media, for example, goes beyond charges 
of manipulation or distortion of public preferences in modem democracies. Baudrillard argues 
that the mass media have eliminated the division between political simulation and reality, so that 
simulation itself has become political reality. It follows that media and polling techniques do not 
distort the political process - they are constitutive of the political process. It becomes impossi-
ble to speak of the distortion of the political process when the thing that is supposed to be 
distorted is created by the very thing that is supposed to be distorting it. Thus, we no longer even 
have the comfort of believing that opinion polls manipulate public opinion, because we can no 
longer isolate political reality, human will, or human nature as something that could be cor-
rupted or distorted by the media reports that create both political reality and our political selves. 
See JEAN BAUDRILLARD: SELECTED WRmNGS 208-10 (Mark Poster ed., 1988). For an intro-
duction to Baudrillard's views, see Christopher Norris, Lost in the Funhouse: Baudril/ard and 
the Politics of Postmodernism, in POSTMODERNISM AND SOCIETY, supra note 12, at 119-53. 
30. THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 247-48. 
31. Thus, it is possible that the "New Puritanism" that has beleaguered political candidates 
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· We must also ask how mediazation has affected methods of inter-
action among various government officials and branches of govern-
ment. Does the ability to manipulate symbols in the media alter the 
ways in which politicians achieve compromises behind closed doors? 
Does it increase opportunities not only to inform but also to mislead 
the public about the nature of proposed legislation? Has mediazation 
increased executive power disproportionately because of the execu-
tive's greater opportunities for manipulation of symbolic forms? Fi-
nally, has mediazation helped to impose increasingly insuperable 
barriers to entry for challengers to incumbent politicians or for per-
sons without access to considerable wealth? The study of the Consti-
tution has always had to confront structural effects and limitations on 
self-government and democratic ideals. A postmodernist constitution-
alism, then, simply asks whether the technological and cultural fea-
tures of the present era have altered these structural effects or 
limitations or added new ones of supervening importance. 
The question of mediazation must also be confronted by anyone 
who seeks to ground democratic theory on any form of dialogism or 
informed public discourse. Mediaized communication conveys infor-
mation on a mass scale, but unidirectionally;32 it arrives instantane-
ously, but in the form of highly charged symbols and sound bites. 
Mediazation of political culture thus jeopardizes the kind of neutral 
dialogism that many contemporary political theorists view as neces-
s~ to the success of their projects.33 Ironically, these philosophical 
projects do not always consider the extent to which technology has 
rendered their dreams impossible of attainment, or even worse, wholly 
irrelevant. Yet no theory of democracy can succeed unless it takes 
these technological changes in dissemination of information into ac-
count. Dialogism may already have died the death of a thousand 
in recent years may be a function not only of changing public values but also of the gradual 
change in public and private conceptions of self traceable to mediazation. See THOMPSON, supra 
note 4, at 246-48. On the recently lamented phenomenon of "pack journalism," in which jour· 
nalists devote inordinate amounts of coverage to sensational allegations about the private lives of 
public figures, see LARRY J. SABATO, FEEDING FRENZY (1991). 
32. MARK POSTER, FOUCAULT, MARXISM, AND HISTORY 115 (1984); THOMPSON, supra 
note 4, at 227-28; L. A. Powe, Jr., Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 SUP. er. 
REV. 243. 
33. Here we should distinguish ideal or "as if" dialogism from actual dialogism. We must 
distinguish theories that attempt to justify political structures as if they were the result of an ideal 
dialogue or deliberative process that did not actually occur from theories that insist legitimacy 
flows from actual deliberation and dialogue, and therefore seek to make the actual political pro· 
cess more deliberative or closer to an ideal dialogic situation. Postmodern culture presents obvi· 
ous problems for the latter group. However, the postmodern experience also presents problems 
for ideal dialogic theories, because it reveals the nonnatural, historically contingent, and techno· 
logically situated nature of our assumptions about dialogue and deliberation. 
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sound bites. 34 
B. Technological Changes Affecting Public Perception and 
Participation in Law 
1981 
What effect have the rise of mass media and the industrialization of 
symbolic forms had on the way that the public understands their legal 
rights and their ability to participate in the legal system? One might 
well invent, by analogy to the phenomenon of "sound bites," the con-
cept of "law bites," or symbols of the legal system that have become 
the common cultural coin of the general public. A classic example of 
the law bite in operation are reports of motorists arrested by Canadian 
police who repeatedly insisted that their Miranda rights be read to 
them.35 Mass broadcast of American police shows (and later L.A. 
Law) has apparently altered the public's perception of the criminal 
and civil justice system, and not only in America. These symbolic rep-
resentations of law become the common forms of discourse and 
benchmarks of expectation about law among the lay public.36 The 
growth of cable networks like C-SPAN, CNN, and Court TV, and 
extensive coverage of trials on television, has increasingly subjected 
legal controversies to a process of mediazation that has already in-
fected politics. Judges, prosecutors, and even witnesses become media 
34. An innovative attempt to meet the crisis in democratic self-government described here 
comes from a political philosopher who does believe in the importance of dialogue in refining and 
reaching a legitimating consensus in liberal democratic societies. Professor James Fishkin has 
argued that a citizen jury or "deliberative opinion poll" of 600 randomly selected Americans 
should be allowed to meet with prospective presidential candidates in a weekend retreat. The 
purpose of the event would be to force face-to-face dialogue and extended discussions of policy 
issues between candidates and citizens. Although the event would be televised, the personal 
interactions between candidates and voters would discourage much of the presentation manage-
ment that modem political campaigning through the mass media encourages. Extended face-to-
face interaction with candidates would be designed to give the participants personal knowledge of 
the characters, strengths, and weaknesses of candidates that is hard to obtain from staged cam-
paign events. After the retreat, the participating citizens would be polled on their views about 
the candidates as well as on public policy issues, and this information would be made available to 
the general public. The citizen jury model is described in detail in JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOC-
RACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM (1991). A candi-
date's retreat along the lines of Fishkin's model was actually planned for the 1992 presidential 
campaign, and would have taken place in January of 1992, but fell through because funding for 
the project could not be procured from interested media organizations. A second attempt is 
currently being planned for 1996. Communication from James S. Fishkin to author. 
35. Herbert H. Denton, Canada Turns to U.S. on Bill of Rights Issues; Meese Joins Debate 
With Speech, WASH. Posr, Aug. 7, 1986, at A30 (noting that "[m]any Canadians who have spent 
hours of their childhood watching police on American detective television read suspects their 
Miranda rights," have mistakenly demanded the same warnings from Canadian police officers). 
36. Cf. Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Prop-
erty Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1853, 1861-65 (1991) (noting how in 
postmodernist culture, shared cultural symbols taken from television shows, movies, advertising 
campaigns, and mass-produced consumer goods become shared resources for construction of 
social meaning). 
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stars; Senate confirmation hearings are scheduled to mesh with the 
demands of prime time viewing. 37 Changes in substance soon follow 
those of form; indeed, at points the Thomas confirmation hearings 
were difficult to distinguish from a particularly sordid episode of 
Geraldo. 
With the mediazation of law and legal processes, the products of 
the Supreme Court and lower courts become transformed in the public 
eye in the same way as the work of politicians. When Supreme Court 
arguments are finally televised, this mediazation may well be on the 
way to its culmination. In the interim, the experience of televised con-
firmation hearings and criminal trials gives us some idea of the brave 
new world of media-saturated law that awaits us. Ironically, then, the 
divide between legal and political discourse may eventually be dis-
solved not by the efforts of critical legal studies, but by those of Ted 
Turner and the Cable News Network. 
As noted above, media communication allows mass participation, 
but only unidirectional participation, because viewers can watch, dis-
tanced in time and/or space, but cannot otherwise interact with the 
sender. In the same way that mass media create the possibility of uni-
directional political participation on a mass scale, so too the mediaza-
tion of law will create opportunities for manipulation of symbolic 
forms, commodification and spectacle. If the Bork hearings symbol-
ized a sea change in the confirmation of Supreme Court nominees and 
a blurring of lines between judicial and political candidates, as many 
have argued, this is not simply due to the bad faith of Bork's political 
opponents. Rather, I suggest that it is at least partly due to the tech-
nological and cultural changes of the postmodern era, which made 
mass political organization and mediazation of the confirmation pro-
cess possible. Opposition to Bork was raised through forms of mass 
politics that would have been impossible without contemporary quasi-
industrial methods of political organization or the use of mass media 
for distribution of messages. 38 Hence, the Bork nomination, for all the 
things that it symbolized, may also have symbolized a breakthrough in 
the mediazation of law. In this way Bork, the pessimistic modernist, 
was defeated, for good or ill, by forces unleashed by the postmodern 
37. See Helen Dewar, Democrats Criticized for Strategy on Thomas; Approach in Hearings 
Called Too Cautious, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1991, at All (noting Bush administration demands 
to schedule Clarence Thomas' testimony during prime time, while Professor Hill's testimony was 
placed during the day when most working people could not watch). 
38. See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 267-349 (1989); ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION 
SHOOK AMERICA (1989). 
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era.39 
C. The Industrialization of Legal Production 
I have argued above that a key postmodernist phenomenon is the 
application of methods of industrial production to symbolic forms, in-
tellectual products, and the life of the mind in general. Information 
and symbol manipulation become important commodities or sources 
of wealth. We can see these features occurring in the legal profession 
as it exchanges an earlier professional ethic for an industrial profes-
sionalism. Examples of the industrialization of symbolic legal forms 
include the growth of large law firms which employ large scale discov-
ery practices, computerization of documents, and other quasi-indus-
trial methods of litigation and work production. As noted above, in 
employer and employee relations, we are seemg the development of a 
quasi-industrial model whereby lawyers are hired, fired, and laid off 
like industrial workers.40 
The judicial chamber and the academy have not escaped the effects 
of postmodern industrialization of symbolic forms, although these in-
fluences are manifested in a somewhat different manner. In the judici-
ary, we see increasing pressures for application of quasi-industrial 
methods to the administration of justice. This is evidenced not only in 
the increasing limitation of time for oral argument, the streamlining of 
dockets, and administrative regulations designed to minimize 
caseloads, but also in the increased use of clerks to write opinions and 
39. As in the case of the Bork nomination, the success of the Thomas nomination appeared 
to tum on the views of voters in a handful of southern and midwestem states represented by the 
few senators who remained publicly undecided. Thus, questions of Thomas' legal qualifications 
(about which even some of his supporters had doubts) were shelved in favor of the sort of issue 
that could be packaged for mass consumption and conveniently played out in front of the televi-
sion cameras - Thomas' sexual behavior. Consequently, the struggle over the nomination inevi-
tably reduced to a struggle over the public's view of the seriousness of the charge of sexual 
harassment and the comparative credibility of Judge Thomas and Professor Hill. What were by 
now relatively standard techniques of media manipulation were used to great effect in this cause. 
Thomas' now-famous "hi-tech lynching" speech, evoking powerful imagery of his destroyed rep-
utation and offering barely concealed accusations of racism against his white opponents, appar-
ently helped to tum the tide in his favor, as did the vigorous attacks on Professor Hill's 
credibility and emotional stability launched by Senators Hatch, Simpson and Specter. With on-
the-spot polling techniques showing a decided swing in voter sympathy towards Thomas after his 
testimony, the Senate's confirmation was assured. One need not label these events "postmodern" 
to wonder at what they portend for the future of American constitutionalism. One need merely 
sit in front of the television and watch. 
40. This process of industrializing legal employment and legal production is no doubt related 
to, but should not be confused with, a perceived decline in professional standards of practice. 
While the "industrialization" process is a product of the twentieth century, and especially the 
late twentieth century, laments about the loss of professional values in the practice of law have 
occurred continuously throughout the history of the American bar. 
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the lack of time for judicial study and reflection - in short, the crea-
tion of an industrial model of adjudication. 
In the academy, we can witness the increasing need to evaluate 
work in terms of discrete units of production. Thus, the equivalent of 
billable hours in the law firm are articles in the legal academy. Aca-
demic organizations are increasingly structured to reward persons 
who produce measurable units of production. Such a process elevates 
objective measurements of quantity over subjective measurements of 
quality, on the grounds that quantity is more easily measurable. This 
produces increasing pressure for academics to publish, not because it 
will increase the valuable knowledge of mankind, but as a symbol of 
scholarly production. The term "productive scholar" thus comes to 
mean the scholar who produces a continuous stream of units of pro-
duction, rather than the scholar who produces meaningful work. 
D. The Fragmentation of the ''Public Sphere" of Legal Discourse, 
and the Rise of "Legal Theory" 
One of the most useful of Habermas' conceptions is the idea of a 
public sphere of discourse arising with the Enlightenment.41 Through 
this public sphere the great issues of the day were debated in coffee 
houses, salons, literature, and eventually through the earliest forms of 
mass media. 42 An important consequence of the postmodern age is 
the destruction or at least transformation of this public sphere due to 
the rise of mass communication, which permits only unidirectional re-
ception as opposed to the participatory dialogue upon which the tradi-
tional public sphere depended.43 We might, by analogy, consider 
whether there has been a "public sphere" for legal discourse in this 
country. I would argue that such a public sphere, in which lawyers, 
judges, and the legal professoriat engaged in a more or less continual 
discourse on the growth, restatement, and reform of positive law, ex-
isted at least from the end of the nineteenth century.44 This public 
sphere continues even today, although the growth of mass media as a 
method for distribution of legal information (Lexis, Westlaw, and 
computer satellite broadcasts of CLE programs) may also threaten its 
disintegration. But perhaps an equally important feature of the disin-
41. JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: 
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger & Frederick Law-
rence trans., 1989). 
42. THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 111. 
43. See id. at 113-20. 
44. See Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. 
REV. 1835 (1988). 
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tegration of this public sphere of legal discourse is the development of 
the special status of the legal academic. The legal academy has, for 
the past twenty-five years at least, become increasingly interdiscipli-
nary. At the same time, it has become increasingly distanced from the 
work of actual lawyers and judges. Pierre Schlag's diatribes against 
normative legal scholarship45 attack the retention of the form of the 
discourse of the public sphere after the sphere itself has dissolved. 
Schlag's attack is well taken with respect to certain types of law, 
although a remnant of a public sphere still remains with respect to 
other types, particularly local and commercial law (with the caveat 
that this public sphere has also been transformed by mediazation). 
Nevertheless, constitutional law is perhaps the best example of how a 
public sphere of legal discourse that once included practitioners, 
judges, and academics has largely disintegrated. In constitutional law, 
we clearly see the fragmentation of legal culture into an increasingly 
conservative body of judges and an academy that is quite liberal and 
whose work is increasingly irrelevant to the actual practice of constitu-
tional adjudication. In my view, this is the best explanation of the 
puzzle I began this essay with. Postmodern legal culture is not neces-
sarily a culture of lawyers and judges who embrace postmodern inter-
pretive theories, but rather a legal culture mimetic of postmodernity: 
fragmented, decentered, diffused. 
As the judiciary becomes increasingly conservative, we witness in-
creasing self-absorption within the legal academy and its increasing 
isolation from legal practice. Once again, these phenomena occur in 
differing degrees in different areas of the law, but they are especially 
pronounced with respect to constitutional scholarship. As a result, a 
new class of academics arises who have little or no interest in practical 
political activity, practical law reform, or even practical restatement of 
the law. Thus, the postmodern period is marked by the creation of a 
species oflegal scholarship known as "legal theory." As a result of the 
rise of interdisciplinary scholarship, genres of scholarship defined by 
traditional practice areas (e.g., contracts, torts) are replaced by schol-
arly genres defined by theoretical allegiances (e.g., law and economics, 
feminist legal theory), which may cut across traditional doctrinal areas 
or simply be irrelevant to them.46 As Sanford Levinson and I have 
described elsewhere, these developments create opportunities for frag-
45. Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, C'est Mai'~· The Politics of Form and the Domestication 
of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 1631 (1990); Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to 
Go, 43 STAN. L. REv. 167 (1990); Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. 
L. REv. 801 (1991); Schlag, supra note 25. 
46. Levinson & Balkin, supra note 8, at 1652-53. 
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mentation not only between the legal academy and legal practitioners, 
but within the legal academy itself.47 
The flip side of academic alienation from practitioners is academ-
ics' increasing lack of respect for the products of judges, legislatures, 
and administrative agencies. Academics increasingly recognize, or 
rather assume, the product of these bodies is written by clerks, politi-
cally biased, incompetently reasoned, or all three at once. At the same 
time, they attempt to redescribe law in terms of ideas that have no 
possible chance of being enacted into legal practice, at least absent a 
miraculous mass indoctrination of the judiciary. We thus witness the 
creation of a "shadow constitution" by progressive scholars, in which 
they declaim what the Constitution really means in the face of the 
increasing likelihood that it will never mean that in practice. 
E. Technological Changes Affecting Privacy and Surveillance Both 
by the State and by Private Organizations 
Finally, a postmodernist constitutionalism must come to grips with 
the effects of technology on privacy, and, more generally, on auton-
omy itself.48 Each of us, whether we recognize it or not, produces 
traces of her activities in material form, just as an animal leaves a trail 
in the dust where it travels. These traces are signs, but, equally impor-
tant, they are material signs. If one were able to capture and recon-
struct increasing numbers of a person's material traces, one would 
have an increasingly full picture of that person - not only of her loca-
tions and activities, but even of her thoughts, beliefs, and desires. 
With the growth of computers, electronic information collection and 
retrieval systems, mass media, electronic recording equipment and fo-
rensic science, it is now possible to organize an incredible number of 
facts about individuals from the traces they leave behind them. For 
example, credit card purchases can be recorded in a data bank that 
can be used to create a consumer profile of customers and trace their 
47. Id. 
48. There is now an increasingly large and important body of scholarship on technology nnd 
privacy, some of which is self-consciously within the body of postmodernist scholarship, but 
much more which is not. In the latter category, the pathbreaking work is ALAN F. WESTIN, 
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967). Many philosophical and economic treatments of privacy have 
emerged recently, although they do not always emphasize technological issues. E.g., KIM L. 
SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS (1988); Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Property Rights, and Misrep-
resentations, 12 GA. L. REv. 455 (1978); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE 
L.J. 421 (1980); Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1979); 
Richard A. Posner, The Right to Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978). A good introduction to the 
legal issues of technology and privacy is Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information 
Society, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 707 (1987). Postmodern treatments have largely been inspired by 
the work of the historian of ideas Michel Foucault on punishment and surveillance. See infra 
notes 49, 50. 
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movements. The use of electronic pricing codes by checkout clerks 
provides a method not only of controlling inventories but also of com-
piling information about purchasers' tastes and preferences. The 
growth of computerization has made possible a revolution in the col-
lection and analysis of information whose scope could hardly have 
been imagined twenty years ago. Matching information from different 
databases makes increasingly possible the production of new kinds of 
surveillance and control. This is the nightmare of Bentham's Panop-
ticon - a prison where each individual's mere knowledge that her 
every movement is known to others is sufficient to effect behavioral 
control without the use of physical force.49 A social Panopticism of 
the kind envisioned by Foucault is now made frighteningly possible by 
contemporary technological advances.50 In this way, knowledge, or 
more correctly information encoded in material form, creates ever new 
sources of power and ever new possibilities for control in the 
postmodern age. 
These developments pose significant problems for constitutional 
theory. Both the state and private individuals will have control over 
the new technologies of information collection and surveillance. What 
limits should be placed on the ability of public and private organiza-
tions to collect, organize, and distribute such information? Tradi-
tional First Amendment philosophy has asserted that the best weapon 
against speech we do not like is still more speech. Does this philoso-
phy continue to make sense in an era of new information and surveil-
lance technologies? Will increased availability of information about 
the most detailed aspects of our lives lessen the dangers of control 
through surveillance or data compilation? Or is the problem precisely 
the opposite - that the availability of the information is itself the 
problem? Do traditional liberal notions of autonomy continue to 
make sense in an age where control of information processing increas-
ingly means new forms of control over individuals themselves? Or has 
the liberal ideal of the free market of ideas now turned in on itself and 
created a new form of totalitarianism, a prison constructed from ac-
cess to information rather than from steel bars? 
These issues strike at the heart of liberal political philosophy. Pri-
49. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200 (Alan 
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1979) (1975). The Panopticon was a prison constructed as a 
quadrangle with a high tower in the center; the guard in the tower could watch the prisoners, but 
they could not see the guard. Thus the prisoners knew that they were constantly subject to 
surveillance, but they could not tell exactly when surveillance was taking place. Id. As a result, 
this technology "induce[s] in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures 
the automatic functioning of power." Id. at 201. 
50. See POSTER, supra note 32, at 102-03, 165-67; PosrER, supra note 23, at 69-98. 
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vacy is deeply related to notions of individualism and individual au-
tonomy. Each of us has both a public and a private self; the public self 
we reveal to the world, and the private self we retain control over by 
withholding it from others. Our ability alternatively to provide or 
withhold aspects of our private selves preserves and constitutes our 
autonomy. Exchanges of private information signal intimacy and 
trust, and their disclosure to third parties is usually thought a sign of 
betrayal. But the ability to withhold information about the private self 
is not wholly a natural attribute of existence - it is technologically 
circumscribed and determined. What will happen to the fabric of inti-
mate relations in a world in which technological advancement increas-
ingly shrinks the domain of the private self? Will traditional 
assumptions about personal privacy (and hence autonomy) still make 
sense, or will they have to be reimagined in wholly different ways? 
And if this is so, what will happen to a constitutional jurisprudence 
based on eighteenth-century notions of privacy and autonomy that as-
sumed a world without our present technological advances? Again, it 
is important to stress how these issues go beyond standard assertions 
about the social construction of the subject. We are concerned here 
with the material linkages of power; we are concerned with how forms 
of technology create new forms of power that will inevitably shape our 
own understandings and expectations about ourselves. If changes in 
material conditions can so alter or undermine our conceptions of pri-
vacy, it is neither our shared ideas nor their social construction that 
become the key issues, but rather technological change and who has 
control over its shape and direction. 
v 
Postmodernism is sometimes described as a rejection of the En-
lightenment and the values of the Enlightenment.51 I prefer to see 
postmodernism as a partial continuation of the Enlightenment, and a 
reevaluation of what was good and bad about the Enlightenment pro-
ject. The Enlightenment sought to free humanity from the chains of 
unthinking tradition and religious bigotry. It sought to master the 
world through science and remake the world according to the dictates 
of reason. It sought to understand and to recast society in rational and 
scientific terms, and it was confident about the ability of the human 
intellect to do this. Two centuries later, humanity is imprisoned by 
51. See, e.g., Alex Callinicos, Reactionary Postmodernism?, in PosrMODERNISM AND SOC!· 
ETY, supra note 12, at 97, 97-100; Anthony Carty, Introduction: Post-Modern Law, in Posr-
MoDERN LAW: ENLIGHTENMENT, REVOLUTION AND THE DEATH OF MAN 1 (Anthony Carty 
ed., 1990). 
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new chains that the Enlightenment forged for us. These are the chains 
created by science, technology, and rationality, which in the course of 
liberating us subjected us to new forms of control, bureaucracy, 
mediazation, suburbanization, and surveillance. We still need libera-
tion, we still need emancipation, but now it is from the products of our 
previous emancipation - from computer data bases, sound bites, 
political action committees, voodoo economics, electronic surveil-
lance, commodified video images, and the industrialization of profes-
sional culture. The emancipation we now require cannot be on the 
same terms as those proposed by the Enlightenment. It must, at least 
in part, be a rejection of the terms by which we freed ourselves from 
pre-Enlightenment thinking. 
Moreover, as I have tried to suggest in this essay, viewing 
postmodernism as a reaction to the Enlightenment neglects a second, 
equally important issue. The Enlightenment is identified primarily 
with ideas and with the quest for knowledge. After all, the very motto 
of the Enlightenment, as announced by Kant, was "Dare to Know."52 
Yet there was much more to modernity than Enlightenment. These 
ideas did not exist in a vacuum but were rather part of increasingly 
rapid technological changes that brought on profound changes in the 
way that individuals led their d~y lives. 53 The material conditions in 
which knowledge and thought were instantiated were just as impor-
tant to modernity as were Enlightenment ideals themselves. Indeed, 
these technological changes were in some ways even more important 
than the liberal humanist ideology of the West. This fact is crucial to 
understanding the meaning of postmodernity in places outside of 
North America and Western Europe. The technological progress of 
modernity reached further throughout the world than its associated 
Enlightenment ideals ever did. The automobile and the television 
have traveled to places that never heard of John Stuart Mill. Perhaps 
the most telling revenge of modernity on itself were scenes broadcast 
to the United States of the Ayatollah Khomeini's followers carrying 
handpainted signs (in English) calling for "Death to the United 
States." Fundamentalist cultures had also learned to manipulate the 
broadcast media produced by western technology in their war against 
the Enlightenment values of the West. Our humanist ideals may rise 
and fall, but our technology goes forward forever, mindlessly and 
powerfully. If the motto of the Enlightenment was "Dare to Know," 
52. IMMANUEL KANT, What is Enlightenment?, in FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF 
MORALS & WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT? 286 (Lewis w. Beck trans., 2d ed. 1955). 
53. See MARSHALL BERMAN, ALL THAT IS SOLID MELTS INTO AIR: THE EXPERIENCE OF 
MODERNITY 18-19 (1982). 
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the motto of the post-Enlightenment should be that Knowledge is Ma-
terial. It is with that principle, perhaps, that a postmodern constitu-
tionalism must begin. 
